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Abstract—In this paper, we study resilient distributed diffusion
for multi-task estimation in the presence of adversaries where
networked agents must estimate distinct but correlated states of
interest by processing streaming data. We show that in general
diffusion strategies are not resilient to malicious agents that do
not adhere to the diffusion-based information processing rules. In
particular, by exploiting the adaptive weights used for diffusing
information, we develop time-dependent attack models that drive
normal agents to converge to states selected by the attacker. We
show that an attacker that has complete knowledge of the system
can always drive its targeted agents to its desired estimates.
Moreover, an attacker that does not have complete knowledge
of the system including streaming data of targeted agents or
the parameters they use in diffusion algorithms, can still be
successful in deploying an attack by approximating the needed
information. The attack models can be used for both stationary
and non-stationary state estimation. In addition, we present
and analyze a resilient distributed diffusion algorithm that is
resilient to any data falsification attack in which the number
of compromised agents in the local neighborhood of a normal
agent is bounded. The proposed algorithm guarantees that all
normal agents converge to their true target states if appropriate
parameters are selected. We also analyze trade-off between the
resilience of distributed diffusion and its performance in terms
of steady-state mean-square-deviation (MSD) from the correct
estimates. Finally, we evaluate the proposed attack models and
resilient distributed diffusion algorithm using stationary and non-
stationary multi-target localization.
Index Terms—Resilient diffusion, multi-task estimation, net-
work topology, adaptive systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Diffusion Least-Mean Squares (DLMS) is a powerful algo-
rithm for distributed state estimation [2]. It enables networked
agents to interact with neighbors to process streaming data and
diffuse information across the network to perform the estima-
tion tasks. Compared to a centralized approach, distributed dif-
fusion offers multiple advantages including robustness to drifts
in the statistical properties of the data, scalability, reliance
on local data, and fast response among others. Applications
of distributed diffusion include spectrum sensing in cognitive
networks [3], target localization [4], distributed clustering [5],
and biologically inspired designs for mobile networks [6].
Diffusion strategies are known to be robust to node and
link failures as well as to high noise levels [7], [8], [9], [10].
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However, it is possible that a single adversarial agent that
does not update its estimates according to the diffusion-based
information processing rules, for instance by retaining a fixed
value throughout, can fail other agents to converge to their true
estimates. Resilience of diffusion-based distributed algorithms
in the presence of such fixed-value Byzantine attacks has been
studied in [2], [5]. A general approach to counteract such
attacks is to allow agents to fuse information collected from
other agents in local neighborhoods using adaptive weights
instead of fixed ones. By doing so, only neighbors estimating
a similar state will be assigned large weights so as to eliminate
the influence of a fixed-value Byzantine adversary.
In this paper, we consider distributed diffusion for multi-
task estimation where networked agents must estimate dis-
tinct, but correlated states of interest by processing streaming
data. Agents use adaptive weights when diffusing information
with neighbors since adaptive weights have been successfully
applied to multi-task distributed estimation problems. How-
ever, we are interested in understanding if adaptive weights
introduce vulnerabilities that can be exploited by Byzantine
adversaries. The first problem we consider is to analyze if it is
possible for an attacker to compromise a node, and make other
nodes in its neighborhood converge to a state selected by the
attacker. Then, we consider a network attack and determine
a minimum set of nodes to compromise to make all nodes
within the network converge to attacker’s desired state.
We assume a strong attack model, that is, the attacker
has complete knowledge of the network topology, streaming
data of targeted agents and their parameters used in the
diffusion algorithm. A strong attacker can know the topology
by monitoring the network, streaming data of agents by
stealthily compromising their sensors/controllers and estab-
lishing backdoor channels, and diffusion parameters by doing
reverse engineering. We note that having complete knowledge
is a strong assumption, however, it is common to assume
a strong attacker with complete knowledge of the system
to examine the resilience of distributed networks [11], [12],
[13], [14], [15]. In addition to this strong attack model, we
also consider a weak attack model in which the attacker
has no knowledge of streaming data of targeted agents or
their parameters. We show that such an attacker can also be
successful in preventing normal agents from converging to true
estimates by approximating their states.
As a result, we show that DLMS, which was considered
to be resilient against Byzantine agents by itself ([2], [5],
[8]), is in fact, not resilient. A Byzantine agent sharing
incorrect estimates whose values are not fixed and change
over time (time-dependent Byzantine attack) can manipulate
the normal agents to converge to incorrect estimates. On the
2one hand, adaptive weights improve the resilience of diffusion
algorithms to fixed-value Byzantine attacks, but on the other
hand, introduce vulnerabilities that can be exploited by time-
dependent attacks. We analyze this issue in detail and propose
a resilient diffusion algorithm that ensures that normal agents
converge to true final estimates in the presence of any data
falsification attack. The main contributions of the paper are
summarized below:
• By exploiting the adaptive weights, we develop attack
models that drive normal agents to converge to states selected
by an attacker. The attack models can be used to deceive
a specific node or the entire network and are applicable to
both stationary and non-stationary state estimation. Although
the attack models are based on a strong knowledge of the
system, we also show that the attack can succeed without such
knowledge.
• We propose a resilient distributed diffusion algorithm pa-
rameterized by a positive integer F . We show that if there
are at most F compromised agents in the neighborhood of a
normal agent, then the algorithm guarantees that normal agents
converge to their actual goal states under any data falsification
attack. If the parameter F selected by the normal agents is
large, the resilient distributed diffusion algorithm degenerates
to non-cooperative estimation. Thus, we also analyze trade-
off between the resilience of distributed diffusion and its
performance degradation in terms of the steady-state MSD.
• We evaluate the proposed attack models for both strong and
weak attacks and the resilient distributed diffusion algorithm
using both stationary and non-stationary multi-target localiza-
tion. The simulation results are consistent with our theoretical
analysis and show that the approach provides resilience to at-
tacks while incurring performance degradation which depends
on the assumption about the number of compromised agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
briefly introduces distributed diffusion. Section III presents the
attack and resilient distributed diffusion problems. Sections
IV and V discuss single node attack and network attack
models respectively. Section VI presents and analyzes the
resilient distributed diffusion algorithm. Section VII provides
simulation results evaluating our approaches with multi-target
localization. Section VIII discusses and evaluates the attack
model that does not require complete knowledge of the system.
Section IX gives a brief overview of the related work and
Section X concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use normal and boldface fonts to denote deterministic
and random variables respectively. The superscript (·)∗ de-
notes complex conjugation for scalars and complex-conjugate
transposition for matrices, E{·} denotes expectation, and ‖ · ‖
denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector.
Consider a network of N (static) agents1, in which an
undirected edge (or a link) between two agents indicates that
they share information and are neighbors of each other. The
neighborhood of an agent k, denoted by Nk is the set of
neighbors of k, including the agent k itself. At each iteration
1We use the terms agent and node interchangeably.
i, agent k has access to a scalar measurement dk(i) and a
regression vector uk,i of size M with zero-mean and uniform
covariance matrix Ru,k , E{u∗k,iuk,i} > 0, which are related
via a linear model of the following form:
dk(i) = uk,iw
0
k + vk(i).
where vk(i) represents a zero-mean i.i.d. additive noise with
variance σ2v,k and w
0
k denotes the unknownM×1 state vector
of agent k.
The objective of each agent is to estimate w0k from (stream-
ing) data {dk(i),uk,i} (k = 1, 2, ..., N, i ≥ 0). The objective
state can be static or dynamic and we represent it as w0k orw
0
k,i
respectively. For simplicity, we use w0k to denote the objective
state in both the static and dynamic cases.
The state w0k can be computed as the the unique minimizer
of the following cost function:
Jk(w) , E{‖dk(i)− uk,iw‖
2}. (1)
An elegant adaptive solution for determining w0k is the least-
mean-squares (LMS) filter [2], where each agent k computes
successive estimators of w0k without cooperation (noncooper-
ative LMS) as follows:
wk,i = wk,i−1 + µku
∗
k,i[dk(i)− uk,iwk,i−1],
where µk > 0 is the step size (can be identical or distinct
across agents).
Compared to noncooperative LMS, diffusion strategies in-
troduce an aggregation step that incorporates information gath-
ered from the neighboring agents into the adaptation mecha-
nism. One powerful diffusion scheme is adapt-then-combine
(ATC) [2] which optimizes the solution in a distributed and
adaptive way using the following update:
ψk,i = wk,i−1+µku
∗
k,i[dk(i)−uk,iwk,i−1] (adaptation) (2)
wk,i =
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i)ψl,i , (combination) (3)
where alk(i) represents the weight assigned to agent l from
agent k that is used to scale the data it receives from l, and
the weights satisfy the following constraints:
alk(i) ≥ 0,
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i) = 1, alk(i) = 0 if l 6∈ Nk.
(4)
Here the intermediate state ψk,i (obtained by the adaptation
step) is shared among neighboring agents and a combination
of neighbors’ intermediate states contribute to the current
estimate wk,i of agent k.
In the case where agents estimate a common state w0 (i.e.,
w0k is same for every k), several fixed combination rules
can be adopted such as Laplacian, Metropolis, averaging, and
maximum-degree [16]. In the case of multiple tasks, agents are
pursuing distinct but correlated objectives w0k . In this case, the
combination rules mentioned above are not applicable because
they simply combine the estimation of all neighbors without
distinguishing if the neighbors are pursuing the same objective.
An agent estimating a different state will prevent its neighbors
from estimating the state of interest.
3Diffusion LMS (DLMS) has been extended for multi-task
networks in [5] using the following adaptive weights:
alk(i) =


γ
−2
lk
(i)
∑
m∈Nk
γ
−2
mk
(i)
, l ∈ Nk
0, otherwise.
(5)
where γ2lk(i) = (1 − νk)γ
2
lk(i − 1) + νk‖ψl,i − wk,i−1‖
2
and νk is a positive step size known as the forgetting factor.
This update enables agents to continuously learn about the
neighbors agents should cooperate with. During the estimation
task, agents pursuing different objectives will continuously
assign smaller weights to each other according to (5). Once
the weights become negligible, communication links between
agents do not contribute to the estimation task. Consequently,
as the estimation proceeds, only the agents estimating the same
state cooperate.
DLMS with adaptive weights (DLMSAW) outperforms the
noncooperative LMS as measured by the steady-state mean-
square-deviation performance (MSD) [2]. For sufficiently
small step-sizes, the network performance of noncooperative
LMS is defined as the average steady-state MSD level among
agents:
MSDncop , lim
i→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
E‖w˜k,i‖
2 ≈
µM
2
· (
1
N
N∑
k=1
σ2v,k),
where w˜k,i , w
0
k − wk,i and M is the size of regression
vector uk,i. The network MSD performance of the diffusion
network (as well as the MSD performance of a normal agent
in the diffusion network) can be approximated by
MSDk ≈ MSDdiff ≈
µM
2
·
1
N
· (
1
N
N∑
k=1
σ2v,k). (6)
In [2], it is shown that MSDdiff =
1
N
MSDncop, which demon-
strates an N -fold improvement of MSD performance.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Diffusion strategies have been shown to be robust to node
and link failures as well as to nodes or links with high noise
levels [8], [9]. In this paper, we are interested in understanding
if the adaptive weights introduce vulnerabilities in the case a
subset of nodes within the network is compromised by a cyber
attack. In this direction, first we analyze if it is possible for
an attacker who has compromised a node k to make nodes
in Nk converge to a state selected by the attacker. Second,
we consider a network attack model in which we determine
a minimum set of nodes to compromise to make the entire
network converge to states selected by the attacker. Finally,
we formulate the resilient distributed diffusion problem that
guarantees that normal agents are not driven to the attack-
ers’ desired states, and continue the normal operation with
the cooperation among neighbors possibly with a degraded
performance.
A. Single Node Attack Model
We consider false data injection attacks deployed by a
strong attacker that has complete knowledge of the system.
In particular, we assume the following for the strong attack.
Assumption 1. A strong attacker knows the topology of
the network, the streaming data of targeted agents and the
diffusion algorithm parameters they use, such as µk.
To examine the resilience of distributed networks, it is
common to assume a strong attack with full knowledge of the
system, for instance, Byzantine attackers having a complete
knowledge of the system are considered in [11], [12], [13],
[14], [15]. However, we also consider a weak attack model
in Section VIII in which an attacker has no knowledge of
agents’ parameters and has no access to their streaming data.
Compromised nodes are assumed to be Byzantine in the sense
that they can send arbitrary messages to their neighbors, and
can also send different messages to different neighbors.
The objective of the attacker is to drive the normal nodes to
converge to a specific state. We assume a compromised node
a wants agent k to converge to state
wak,i =
{
wak , for stationary estimation
wak + θ
a
k,i, for non-stationary estimation.
This is equivalent to minimizing the objective function of the
following form:
min
wk,i
lim
i→∞
G(wk,i), w
a
k,i ∈ Dw,k, (7)
where
G(wk,i) = ‖wk,i − w
a
k,i‖
2,
and Dw,k is the domain of state wk,i.
Another objective of the attacker can be to delay the
convergence time of the normal agents. We observe that if
the compromised node can make its neighbors to converge to
a selected state, it can keep changing this state before normal
neighbors converge. By doing so, normal neighbors of the
attacked node will never converge to a fixed state. Thus, the
attacker can achieve its goal to prolong the convergence time
of normal neighbors. For that reason, we focus on the attack
model based on objective (7).
B. Network Attack Model
If the attacker has a specific target node that she wants to
attack and make it converge to a specific state, the attacker
can compromise any neighbor of this node to achieve the
objective. In the case the attacker wants to compromise the
entire network and drive the multi-task estimation to specific
states, she needs to determine a minimum set of nodes to
compromise such that every normal node in the network can
be driven to an incorrect estimate. Computing such a minimum
set directly depends on the underlying structure, and can be
formulated as minimum dominating set problem in graphs as
discussed in Section V.
C. Resilient Distributed Diffusion
Distributed diffusion is said to be resilient if
lim
i→∞
wk,i = w
0
k. (8)
for all normal agents k in the network which ensures that all
the noncompromised nodes converge to the true state.
4We note that if agents do not cooperate or interact with each
other at all, such as in the non-cooperative diffusion, then ad-
versary cannot impact agents’ estimates. So, non-cooperative
diffusion is resilient in this sense. At the same time, agents
are also unable to utilize the information from other agents
aiming to achieve the similar objective. Consequently, the
steady-state MSD as result of non-cooperative diffusion can be
quite large. Here, our objective is to design a resilient diffusion
algorithm that guarantees convergence to the true estimates in
the presence of adversary and also results in smaller MSD
(as compared to the non-cooperative diffusion) by leveraging
cooperation and information exchange between agents. We
assume that in the neighborhood of a normal node, there could
be at most F compromised nodes [11]. Assuming bounds on
the number of adversaries is typical for the resiliency analysis
of distributed algorithms, and our resilient algorithm is also
based on this assumption.
IV. SINGLE NODE ATTACK DESIGN
We design a strong attack in which the attacker drives the
targeted node k to converge to a wrong estimate wak,i by
making k follow a desired trajectory defined using stochastic
gradient descent. The attacker’s goal is to ensure that k, which
implements adaptive-then-combine LMS, actually updates its
estimates according to the stochastic gradient descent defined
by the attacker. Thus, the main task is to determine conditions
under which adaptive-then-combine LMS of k guarantees the
convergence of k’s estimate to wak,i.
We summarize the conditions below and then analyze them
in detail in the rest of the section. Firstly, an attacker needs
to know the estimate of node k in the previous iteration.
Lemma 1 shows that an attacker can obtain the estimate given
node k’s streaming data and parameters. Secondly, Node k
should not assign any weight to the messages from its non-
attacked neighbors. Lemma 2 ensures this objective. Finally,
the magnitude of the stochastic gradient descent update should
be sufficiently small. Details are given in Proposition 1.
A. Gradient-based Attack Design
Here, we present an attack based on gradient-descent up-
dates, and in the next subsection, provide conditions under
which the attack is successful. For stationary estimation, the
following gradient-descent update with a sufficient small step
size µak at the i
th iteration is sufficient to achieve the objective
in (7):
wk,i = wk,i−1 − µ
a
k∇wG(wk,i−1)
= wk,i−1 − r
a
k(wk,i−1 − w
a
k,i),
(9)
where rak = 2µ
a
k is a non-negative step size (that can also
be time-varying). For non-stationary estimation, the form is
slightly different and it is described by2
wk,i = wk,i−1 − r
a
k(wk,i−1 − xi), (10)
2See proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
where
xi =
{
wak , for stationary estimation
wak + θ
a
k,i−1 +
∆θak,i−1
ra
k,i
, for non-stationary estimation
with ∆θak,i = θ
a
k,i+1− θ
a
k,i. And the diffusion estimate of k is
wk,i =
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i)ψl,i =
∑
l∈Nk\a
alk(i)ψl,i + aak(i)ψa,i.
It is sufficient to achieve the attack objective (7) if the attacker
could make the estimate of k follow the gradient-descent
trajectory, i.e.,∑
l∈Nk\a
alk(i)ψl,i+aak(i)ψa,i = wk,i−1−r
a
k(wk,i−1−w
a
k,i).
(11)
Since ψl,i = wl,i−1 + µlu
∗
l,i[dl(i)− ul,iwl,i−1] is a random
variable that is not controlled by the attacker, the attacker
should eliminate the influence of ψl,i for l ∈ Nk, l 6= a.
Sufficient conditions to hold (11), and thus to achieve the
attack objective are as follows:
ψa,i = wk,i−1 − r
a
k(wk,i−1 − xi). (12)
and
alk(i)→ 0, ∀l ∈ Nk, l 6= a, and aak(i)→ 1, (13)
That is, the attacker uses the exchanging message ψk,i as
indicated in (12) and the targeted node k updates its estimate
based only on ψk,i. ψk,i is computed given the knowledge of
wk,i−1, that can be obtained by the attacker given Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. 3 If a compromised node a has a knowledge of
node k’s streaming data {dk(i),uk,i} and the parameter µk,
then it can compute wk,i−1.
Next, we see that by carefully designing ψa,i as explained
in Lemma 2, conditions in (13) are satisfied.
Lemma 2. If the attacker sends the message ψa,i satisfying
‖ψa,i−wk,i−1‖ ≪ ‖ψl,i −wk,i−1‖, ∀l ∈ Nk, l 6= a, ∀i, then
(13) will be true.
B. Sufficient Conditions and Convergence Analysis
Here, using results from the previous subsection, we present
conditions that guarantee a successful attack. A direct conse-
quence of Lemma 2 is that we could replace the condition in
(13) by ‖ψa,i − wk,i−1‖ ≪ ‖ψl,i − wk,i−1‖, ∀l ∈ Nk, l 6=
a, ∀i. At the same time, from (12), we get
‖ψa,i −wk,i−1‖ = ‖r
a
k(wk,i−1 − xi)‖.
Therefore, a sufficient condition to achieve the attack objec-
tive can be rewritten as
ψa,i = wk,i−1 − r
a
k(wk,i−1 − xi),
s.t. ‖rak(wk,i−1 − xi)‖ ≪ ‖ψl,i −wk,i−1‖.
(14)
Thus, the attacker has to select a sufficiently small value of rak
to make (14) true. Note that even though rak = 0 is sufficient
3The proofs can be found in the Appendix.
5for (14), it renders the gradient of (9) zero and as a result no
progress is made towards convergence to wak,i. Also note that
to use (14), it is assumed that the communication message
ψl,i from every l ∈ Nk is known by the attacker, which
can be achieved by intercepting the message. In practice, a
sufficiently small value of rak guarantees that the condition
holds. The attacker can select a small rak and observe if the
attack succeeds; if not, decrease rak to find an appropriate
value. It is also worth noting that for a fixed value of
rak , (14) may not hold for some iteration i because of the
randomness of variables. Yet we can always set rak = 0 for
such iterations i (no progress at the current point). However,
in practice, the attack succeeds by using a small fixed value of
rak > 0 since estimation is robust to infrequent small values of
‖ψl,i − wk,i−1‖ caused by randomness given the smoothing
property of the adaptive weight.
Next, we argue that (14) is sufficient to achieve the attack
objective. We summarize the above discussion in Proposition
1 and include a detailed proof in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. If rak > 0 is selected such that ∀l ∈ Nk∩l 6= a,
∀i ≥ ia, ‖rak(wk,i−1 − xi)‖ ≪ ‖ψl,i − wk,i−1‖, then the
compromised node a can realize the objective (7) by using
ψa,i described in (12) as the communication message with k.
Next, we discuss the convergence time of attack. Note that
as i→∞,
lim
i→∞
(1− rak)
i = 0.4
In practice, when the left side of the above equation is smaller
than a certain small value ǫ, that is,
(1− rak)
iac (ǫ) ≤ ǫ,
we consider that the convergence to the desired state is
achieved. Moreover, time required to reach the desired state
is denoted by iac (ǫ), and is computed as
iac (ǫ) =
log ǫ
log(1 − rak)
. (15)
It is also worth mentioning that it is not necessary to start
the attack at the beginning of the diffusion task in order to
guarantee the convergence of the attack. In other words, the
attack can start at any time even after the diffusion algorithm
has converged to its correct target as long as the condition in
Proposition 1 is satisfied.
V. NETWORK ATTACK DESIGN
In this section, we consider the case when multiple nodes
are compromised using the attack model presented above.
Our objective is to determine the minimum set of nodes to
compromise in order to attack the entire network. For this, we
show: (1) It is not necessary for the attacker to compromise
multiple compromised nodes in order to attack a single node
and (2) it is not possible for a compromised node to influence
nodes, that is, make such nodes not converge to the desired
states, that are not its immediate neighbors. Therefore, the
minimum set to compromise is simply a minimum dominating
set of the network, which we explain later in the section.
4Refer to equation (26) in the Appendix..
A. Impact of Compromised Nodes on Normal Nodes
In this subsection, first we discuss the impact of multiple
compromised nodes attacking a single normal node, and then
analyze the impact of a compromised node can make beyond
its immediate neighbors.
Lemma 3. If the compromised nodes send identical message
as proposed in (12), then multiple compromised nodes attack-
ing one normal node is equivalent to one compromised node
attacking the normal node.
The next problem to consider is if a compromised node
could indirectly impact its neighbors’ neighbors that at the
same time are not the neighbors of the attacker a. To illustrate
this, we consider an attacker node a, a normal node l, and a
large clique5 of normal nodes C such that each node in a clique
is connected to both a and l, and there is no edge between
nodes a and l.
Using the proposed attack model, a is able to drive every
node in the clique to converge to its selected state. We are
interested in finding if the normal node l, that is connected
to the clique, is also affected by the attack. The state of l is
obtained by
wl,i =
∑
k∈C
akl(i)ψk,i + all(i)ψl,i
=
∑
k∈C
akl(i)(wk,i−1 + µku
∗
k,i[dk(i)− uk,iwk,i−1])
+ all(i)(wl,i−1 + µlu
∗
l,i[dl(i)− ul,iwl,i−1]).
(16)
We use Rk,i to denote the random variable µku
∗
k,i[dk(i)−
uk,iwk,i−1] for k in the clique and Rl,i to denote
µlu
∗
l,i[dl(i)−ul,iwl,i−1] for normal node l. Suppose the com-
promised node a could affect nodes beyond its neighborhood,
from some point i, wk,i converges to w
a
k and wl,i converges
to wal (assume both w
a
k 6= w
0
k and w
a
l 6= w
0
l ).
Thus, (16) turns into:
wal =
∑
k∈C
akl(i)(w
a
k +Rk,i) + (1−
∑
k∈C
akl(i))(w
a
l +Rl,i)
=
∑
k∈C
akl(i)(w
a
k − w
a
l +Rk,i −Rl,i) + w
a
l +Rl,i.
(17)
After inserting constants and random variables, (17) can be
written as∑
k∈C
akl(i)(w
a
l −w
a
k) =
∑
k∈C
akl(i)Rk,i+(1−
∑
k∈C
akl(i))Rl,i.
(18)
Here, (wak −w
a
l ) is a constant and alk(i) changes slowly and
can be considered as a constant that does not change within a
small period of time. Then, (18) implies a constant equals to
a random variable, which does not hold except that both sides
equal to zero. For the left side, that is when
∑
k∈C akl(i)→ 0
or (wal − w
a
k) → 0. Consider, when (w
a
l − w
a
k) → 0, that is,
5Every node is connected to every other node in a clique.
6wal → w
a
k . In such cases,
Rl,i = µlu
∗
l,i[dl(i)− ul,iwl,i−1]
= µlu
∗
l,i[ul,iw
0
l + vl(i)− ul,iw
a
l ]
= µlu
∗
l,i[ul,i(w
0
l − w
a
l ) + vl(i)] 6= 0.
So is Rk,i. Therefore, equation (18) does not hold under the
condition (wal − w
a
k)→ 0.
The other possible solution for equation (18) is when∑
k∈C akl(i) → 0. This means l does not assign any weight
to k ∈ C and operates by itself. In such cases, equation
(18) holds when the right side of the equation is zero. Since∑
k∈C akl(i) → 0, the right side turns into Rl,i. We know
when l converges to its true objective state w0l , Rl,i is zero,
i.e.,
Rl,i = µlu
∗
l,i[dl(i)− ul,iwl,i−1]
= µlu
∗
l,i[ul,iw
0
l + vl(i)− ul,iw
0
l ]
= µlu
∗
l,ivl(i)→ 0.
Thus, equation (18) holds under two conditions: First,∑
k∈C akl(i)→ 0, that is, l does not give any weight to k ∈ C.
Second,Rl,i → 0, that is, l converges to its true objective state
w0l .
We note that the above two conditions indicate that l con-
verges to its original goal state and will not assign any weight
to its compromised neighbors under the above conditions.
Based on this discussion, we have Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. The attacker cannot change the convergence state
of the nodes that are not its immediate neighbors.
Next, we see how many compromised nodes are needed to
attack the entire network.
B. Minimum Set of Compromised Nodes to Attack the Entire
Network
Since it is not necessary to use more than one compromised
nodes to attack one single normal agent, and a compromised
node cannot affect nodes beyond its neighborhood, finding a
minimum set of nodes to compromise in order to attack the
entire network is equivalent to finding a minimum dominating
set of the network as defined below [17].
Definition 1. (Dominating set) A dominating set of a graph
G = (V,E) is a subset D of V such that every vertex not in
D is adjacent to at least one member of D.
Definition 2. (Minimum dominating set) A minimum domi-
nating set of a graph is a dominating set of the smallest size.
It should be noted that finding a minimum dominating set
of a network is an NP-complete problem but approximate
solutions using greedy approaches work well in practice (for
instance, see [17]). With the above discussion, we state the
following:
Proposition 2. The compromised nodes need to form a dom-
inating set if the attacker wants every node in the network to
converge to its desired state.
Based on the above discussion, we observe that the above
condition is both necessary and sufficient.
VI. RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED DIFFUSION
In this section, we propose a resilient diffusion algorithm
that guarantees convergence of normal nodes to their actual
states if the number of compromised nodes in the neighbor-
hood of a normal node is bounded. The proposed algorithm
takes a non-negative integer F as an input parameter. If
the number of compromised nodes in the neighborhood of
a normal node is at most F , then the algorithm is resilient
to any such attack. It is obvious that selecting a large F
value achieves a higher level of resilience, while selecting
F = 0 means that the algorithm is not resilient to any attack.
However, there exists a trade-off between the resilience and the
steady-state MSD performance of the algorithm, which we will
analyze in detail. Since the proposed algorithm is adapted from
the known DLMSAW, we call it a Resilient Diffusion Least
Mean Square with Adaptive Weights (R-DLMSAW). We also
note that in contrast to the connectivity requirements needed
by resilient concensus problems [11], since in resilient diffu-
sion, connectivity does not affect convergence, but only the
estimation performance measured by the steady-state MSD.
Since our algorithm can achieve resilience to up to F
compromised nodes, we assume that there can be at most F
compromised nodes in the neighborhood of any node, which
is also referred to as the F -local model in [11]. Specifically,
we define:
Definition 3. (F -local model) A node satisfies the F -local
model if there is at most F compromised nodes in its neigh-
borhood.
Definition 4. (F -local network) A network is considered to
satisfy the F -local model if every node in the network has at
most F compromised nodes in its neighborhood.
While the paper focuses on the F -local model, scenarios
involving bounds on the total number of compromised nodes
within the network (F -total model [11]) can also be analyzed
using a similar approach. Next, we describe our resilient
diffusion algorithm.
A. Resilient Diffusion Algorithm (R-DLMSAW)
In the context of distributed consensus, it is shown in [11]
that for Mean-Subsequence-Reduced (MSR) algorithms, that
during the state update phase, a node discards the values of
neighbors that are too far off from the node’s own value,
resilience against attacks can be achieved, that is, distributed
consensus in the presence of compromised nodes (F -local
and F -total models) is guaranteed. In distributed diffusion, we
recall that a node updates its estimate by taking a weighted
average of the estimates of all of its neighbors (3). For
resilient diffusion, we utilize a similar idea as in [11], that
is instead of considering the estimates of all neighbors during
the state update phase, only consider values from a subset of
neighbors sharing close estimates. We show that this strategy
guarantees convergence of normal nodes to true estimates.
7Before outlining the resilient distributed diffusion algorithm,
we first explain the notion of the cost of a node.
Following (3), normal agent k follows diffusion dynamics
given by
wk,i =
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i)ψl,i.
Thus, the cost function in (1) in the ith iteration can be
written as:
Jk(wk,i) = Jk(
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i)ψl,i)
= E{‖dk(i)− uk,i(
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i)ψl,i)‖
2}.
Since
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i) = 1, we have
dk(i) =
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i)dk(i).
Thus,
Jk(wk,i) = E{
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i)dk(i)−
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i)uk,iψl,i‖
2}
= E{‖
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i)(dk(i)− uk,iψl,i)‖
2}
=
∑
l∈Nk
a2lk(i)E{‖dk(i)− uk,iψl,i‖
2}
=
∑
l∈Nk
a2lk(i)Jk(ψl,i)
=
∑
l∈Nk
γ−4lk (i)Jk(ψl,i)
[
∑
m∈Nk
γ−2mk(i)]
2
.
(19)
The goal of k is to minimize its cost at every iteration, i.e.,
to minimize Jk(wk,i) by discarding F neighbors’ message.
Therefore, the removal set Rk(i) of size F should be selected
by
Rk(i) = argmin Jk(wk,i)
= argmin
∑
l∈Nk\Rk(i)
γ−4lk (i)Jk(ψl,i)
[
∑
m∈Nk\Rk(i)
γ−2mk(i)]
2
.
We note that the algorithm presented here is a generalization
of the algorithm in [1] which is resilient to a specific type
of Byzantine attack and has a lower computational cost. In
contrast, the algorithm proposed in this work is resilient to any
Byzantine attack, but has a higher computational cost. Thus,
there is a trade off between the computation complexity of the
algorithm and the scope of attacks to which the algorithm is
resilient.
To compute the cost Jk(ψl,i) = E‖dk(i)−uk,iψl,i‖
2, agent
k has to store all the streaming data. Alternatively, we can
approximate Jk(ψl,i) using a moving average based on the
previous iterations.
Next, we outline the basic idea of the proposed resilient
distributed diffusion algorithm below, and present the details
of R-DLMSAW in Algorithm 1.
1) If F ≥ |Nk|, agent k updates its current state wk,i using
only its own ψk,i, which degenerates distributed diffusion
to non-cooperative LMS.
2) If F < |Nk|, at each iteration i, agent k computes
(
|Nk|
F
)
possible removal sets, and selects the one by removing
which Jk(ψl,i) is minimized. Then, the agent updates
its current weight alk(i) and state wk,i without using
information from nodes in Rk(i).
We note that for F = 0, DLMSAW and R-DLMSAW are
essentially identical.
Algorithm 1: Resilient distributed diffusion under F -local
bounds (R-DLMSAW)
Input: γ2lk(−1) = 0 , maintain n× 1 matrix Dk,i = 0n×1 and
n×M matrix Uk,i = 0n×M for all k = 1, 2, ..., N , and
l ∈ Nk
1 for k = 1, 2, ..., N, i ≥ 0 do
2 ek(i) = dk(i)− uk,iwk,i−1
3 ψk,i = wk,i−1 + µku
∗
k,iek(i)
4 if F ≥ |Nk| then
5 wk,i = ψk,i
6 else
7 γ2lk(i) = (1− νk)γ
2
lk(i− 1) + νk‖ψl,i −wk,i−1‖
2
8 Update Dk,i and Uk,i by adding dk(i) and uk,i and
removing dk(i− n) and uk,i−n
9 Jk(ψl,i) = E‖Dk,i − Uk,iψl,i‖
2
10 Compute all possible discarded set Rk(i)
1, Rk(i)
2,
. . ., Rk(i)(
|Nk|
F )
11 Jmin =∞
12 for j = 1, 2, . . . ,
(
|Nk|
F
)
do
13 J =
∑
l∈Nk\Rk(i)
j γ
−4
lk
(i)Jk(ψl,i)
[
∑
m∈Nk\Rk(i)
j γ
−2
mk
(i)]2
14 if J < Jmin then
15 Rk(i) = Rk(i)
j
16 Jmin = J
17 alk(i) =
γ
−2
lk
(i)
∑
m∈Nk\Rk(i)
γ
−2
mk
(i)
, l ∈ Nk\Rk(i)
18 wk,i =
∑
l∈Nk\Rk(i)
alk(i)ψl,i
19 return wk,i
Proposition 3. If the network is a F -local network, then R-
DLMSAW is resilient to any message falsification attack.
Proof. Given the F -local model, we assume that there are
n ≤ F compromised nodes in the neighborhood of a normal
node k. In the case of F ≥ |Nk|, k updates its state without us-
ing information from neighbors. Next, consider the case when
F < |Nk|. To deploy the attack, the attacker must try to make
the message it sends to the normal nodes not being discarded
by the normal nodes. This can only be achieved if the cost of
keeping the attacker’s message is smaller than keeping some
normal agents’ message (discarding the attacker’s message).
Therefore, any attack message not being discarded actually
results in a cost smaller than the normal case. Therefore, R-
DLMSAW is resilient to any message falsification attack. From
the attacker’s perspective, since its goal is to maximize cost
Jk(wk,i), the optimal strategy for the attacker is not to make
this cost even smaller. As a result, the information from the
attacker will be discarded.
8Thus,
wk,i =
∑
l∈Nk\Rk(i)
alk(i)ψl,i,
meaning the algorithm performs the diffusion adaptation step
as if there were no compromised node in its neighborhood.
Note that messages from normal neighbors may also be
discarded since F may be greater than the number of compro-
mised neighbors. However, the distributed diffusion algorithm
is robust to node and link failures [8], and it converges to the
true state despite the links to some or all of its neighbors fail.
Finally, the algorithm will converge and equation (8) holds,
showing the resilience of R-DLMSAW.
B. Trade-off Between Resilience and MSD Performance
An important aspect of R-DLMSAW is the selection of
parameter F by each normal node. On the one hand, selection
of a large F degrades the performance of the diffusion
algorithm as measured by the steady-state MSD, but on the
other hand, a smaller F might result in an algorithm that is
not resilient against attacks. In the following, we summarize
the trade-off between the steady-state MSD performance and
resilience.
It is rather obvious that if a normal node selects F smaller
than the number of compromised nodes in its neighborhood,
then the messages from the compromised nodes might not
be discarded entirely during the state update phase of R-
DLMSAW. As a result, the algorithm might not be resilient
against the attack, and the normal node might eventually
converge to the attacker’s desired state. However, if F is
selected too large, then in the worst case, normal agents
discard all the information from their neighbors. The al-
gorithm becomes a non-cooperative diffusion algorithm and
incurs an N -fold MSD performance deterioration. Thus, the
performance of R-DLMSAW lies somewhere in-between the
cooperative diffusion and non-cooperative diffusion depending
on the choice of F selected.
Consider a connected network with N normal agents run-
ning R-DLMSAW. Let σ2v,k = {σ
2
v,1, . . . , σ
2
v,N} be the noise
variance. Suppose by selecting some F the network is resilient,
but is no longer a connected graph and is decomposed into
n connected sub-networks, each of which is denoted by Sj
where j ∈ {1, · · · , n}. Using (6), the steady-state MSD for
each sub-network is
MSDSj ≈
µM
2
·
1
(|Sj |)2
∑
k∈Sj
σ2v,k,
where |Sj | is the number of nodes in j
th sub-network. The
steady-state MSD for the overall network (consisting of sub-
networks) after running R-DLMSAW is the weighted average
of the steady-state MSD of the sub-networks, that is
MSDafter =
1
N
n∑
j=1
MSDSj · |Sj | ≈
µM
2N
·
n∑
j=1
1
|Sj |
∑
k∈Sj
σ2v,k.
At the same time, the steady-state MSD for the (original)
connected network before running R-DLMSAW is
MSDbefore ≈
µM
2
·
1
N2
N∑
k=1
σ2v,k ≈
µM
2N
·
n∑
j=1
1
N
∑
k∈Sj
σ2v,k.
The difference between the two is
MSDafter −MSDbefore =
µM
2N
·
n∑
j=1
(
1
|Sj |
−
1
N
)
∑
k∈Sj
σ2v,k.
We know that |sj | ≤ N . Therefore,
1
|Sj |
− 1
N
≥ 0, meaning the
steady-state MSD of the network after running R-DLMSAW
is worse than the steady-state MSD of the original network,
and as the network is decomposed into more sub-networks,∑n
j=1(
1
|Sj|
− 1
N
) and MSDafter becomes larger.
Therefore, it is crucial to select an appropriate F , that is
a value with which the algorithm is resilient against com-
promised nodes and at the same time useful links between
nodes are preserved. To this end, a simple way to select F
is to first estimate wncop,k,i by a non-cooperative diffusion
and compute Jk(wncop,k,i). Then, starting with a small F , for
instance F = 0, perform cooperative diffusion and compute
Jk(wcoop,k,i). If Jk(wcoop,k,i) > Jk(wncop,k,i), it means that
a compromised node is able to effect the estimation, and
therefore increase F by 1. We keep repeating this as long
as Jk(wcoop,k,i) > Jk(wncop,k,i) is true.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate three algorithms, non-
cooperative diffusion, DLMSAW, and R-DLMSAW; and com-
pare their performance for no-attack and attack scenarios. We
evaluate the proposed attack model and resilient algorithms
using the application of multi-target localization [16], [18] for
both stationary and non-stationary targets.
We consider a network of N = 100 agents, in which each
agent’s objective is to estimate the unknown location of its
target of interest by the noisy observations of both the distance
and the direction vector towards the target. These agents and
targets are distributed in a plane. The location of agent k is
denoted by the two-dimensional vector pk = [xk, yk]
⊤, and
similarly the location of target is represented by the vector
w0k = [x
0
k, y
0
k]
⊤. Figure 1 illustrates how an agent estimates
the location of the target.
target
agent k
r0k
u0k
[xk, yk]
⊤
[x0k, y
0
k]
⊤
Fig. 1: Illustration of target localization.
In Figure 1, the distance between agent k and the target
is denoted by r0k = ‖w
0
k − pk‖, and the unit direction vector
from agent k to the target is u0k =
(w0k−pk)
⊤
‖w0
k
−pk‖
. Therefore, the
9relationship holds such that r0k = u
0
k(w
0
k − pk). Since agents
have only noisy observations {rk(i),uk,i} of the distance and
direction vector at every iteration i, we get the following:
rk(i) = uk,i(w
0
k − pk) + vk(i).
If we use the adjusted signal dk(i), such that
dk(i) = rk(i) + uk,ipk,
then we derive the following linear model for variables
{dk(i),uk,i} in order to estimate the target w
0
k:
dk(i) = uk,iw
0
k + vk(i).
As a result, agents can rely on DLMSAW algorithm for the
multi-target localization problem. Figure 2a shows the network
topology before the application of diffusion algorithms. For
better readability, we only illustrate the network topology of
agents without showing targets.
For stationary target localization, the location of the two
stationary targets are given by
w0k =
{
[0.1, 0.1]⊤, for k depicted in blue
[0.9, 0.9]⊤, for k depicted in green
Non-stationary targets are given by
w0k,i =


[
0.1 + 0.1 cos(2πωi)
0.1 + 0.1 sin(2πωi)
]
, for k depicted in blue
[
0.9 + 0.1 cos(2πωi)
0.9 + 0.1 sin(2πωi)
]
, for k depicted in green
where ω = 12000 .
Regression data is white Gaussian with diagonal covariance
matrices Ru,k = σ
2
u,kIM with M = 2, σ
2
u,k ∈ [0.8, 1.2] and
noise variance σ2k ∈ [0.15, 0.2]. The step size of µk = 0.01
and the forgetting factor νk = 0.01 are set uniformly across
the network. Note that we adopt a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
of 5 − 10 dB in our setup. However, the same results are
generated if we choose low SNR values.
A. Strong Attacks
We consider the strong attack model discussed in Sec-
tions IV and V. The attacker aims at making the nor-
mal agents estimate a specific location selected by the
attacker. In this evaluation, we select the attacker’s tar-
geted location to be wak = [0.5, 0.5]
⊤, and the attack
parameters are selected uniformly across the compromised
agents as rak = 0.002. For non-stationary estimation, we
select θak,i = [0.1 cos(2πωai), 0.1 sin(2πωai)]
⊤, ∆θak,i =
[−0.2πωa sin(2πωai), 0.2πωa cos(2πωai)]⊤, where ωa =
1
2000 . Figure 2b shows the network topology at the end of the
simulation using DLMSAW with no attack for both stationary
and non-stationary tasks. If the weights between agents k
and l are such that alk(i) < 0.01 and akl(i) < 0.01, then
we remove the link between such nodes from the network.
We observe that only the links between agents estimating
the same target are kept, that is green nodes are connected
with green nodes only, and blue nodes are connected with
only blue ones, thus, illustrating the robustness of DLMSAW
in multi-task networks. Figure 3a and Figure 3b shows the
estimation dynamics by DLMSAW for the targets’ locations
wk,i(1) and wk,i(2) for every agent k and iteration i from
0 to 5000 under no attack. Here wk,i(1) and wk,i(2) are the
first and second element of the estimate respectively, that is
wk,i = [wk,i(1),wk,i(2)]
⊤. It is shown that the two groups
of nodes converge to their goal state.
Figure 2c shows the initial network topology with compro-
mised nodes. There are four compromised nodes (red nodes
with yellow centres) in the network. Figure 2d shows the
network topology at the end of DLMSAW in the case of a
strong attack. All red nodes are the normal agents converging
to wak . We observe that neighbors of a compromised node
communicate only with the compromised node, and not with
any other node in the network. As a result, compromised nodes
successfully drive all of their neighbors to desired states wak
as discussed in Section V. Figure 3c and Figure 3d shows the
estimation dynamics by DLMSAW for the targets’ location
wk,i(1) and wk,i(2) for every agent k and iteration from 0 to
5000 under attack. The attacked nodes in the figure refer to the
immediate neighbors of the compromised nodes. It is shown
that all the immediate neighbors of compromised nodes are
driven to converge to wak whereas all the other normal nodes
converge to their original goal states.
Figure 4a shows the convergence of nodes under attack
(stationary targets). We note at around 3000 iterations, the
difference between the average state of nodes under attack
and the attacker’s desired state wak becomes almost zero. This
observation is also consistent with the result in (15), as for
i = 3000 and rak = 0.002, the value of ǫ turns out to be 0.0025,
which is indeed quite small and indicates the convergence of
node’s estimate to wak .
Figure 4b shows the average state dynamics of nodes under
attack for non-stationary targets. Since states are changing over
time, we illustrate the dynamics of average states’ changing
with respect to the dynamics of attacker’s selected state,
instead of a convergence plot like 4a. Here, the X-coordinate
denotes the first element of the estimation vector, i.e., wk,i(1),
and Y -coordinate denotes the second, i.e.,wk,i(2). At iteration
0, the average state wk,i of the nodes under attack is different
than the attacker’s desired state wak,i. As the attack proceeds,
wk,i gradually converges towards w
a
k,i, which shows the
effectiveness of attack for non-stationary state estimation.
Figure 5 shows the steady-state MSD performance of DLM-
SAW and non-cooperative LMS. We observe that under no
attack, cooperation indeed improves the steady-state MSD per-
formance of DLMSAW. However, in the case of an attack, the
steady-state MSD level of DLMSAW is quite high, whereas,
the steady-state MSD level of non-cooperative LMS is barely
affected by the attack.
B. Resilient Diffusion for Strong Attacks
To evaluate R-DLMSAW, we compute the cost Jk(ψl,i)
using the streaming data from the latest 100 iterations. We
adopt uniform F for every normal agent but it can be distinct
for each agent. R-DLMSAW behaves identically to DLMSAW
at one extreme, that is when F = 0, and on the other extreme
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(a) Initial network topology (no
compromised nodes)
(b) At the end of DLMSAW with no
attack
(c) Initial network topology (with
compromised nodes)
(d) At the end of DLMSAW under
strong attack
Fig. 2: Network topologies in the case of DLMSAW algorithm.
(a) wk,i(1) (under no attack) (b) wk,i(2) (under no attack) (c) wk,i(1) (under strong attack) (d) wk,i(2) (under strong attack)
Fig. 3: Estimation dynamics for stationary target localization by DLMSAW.
(a) Stationary targets (b) Non-stationary targets
Fig. 4: Average state dynamics of compromised nodes neighbors
(under strong attack).
(a) Stationary targets (b) Non-stationary targets
Fig. 5: Steady-state MSD levels in non-cooperative LMS
and DLMSAW (under strong attack).
it behaves like a non-cooperative LMS algorithm, that is for
large F . We consider the same initial network as in Figure 2a
and consider an attack consisting of four compromised nodes
as previously. Note that there is at most one compromised
node in the neighborhood of a normal agent. Figure 6 shows
network topologies after executing R-DLMSAW for various
values of F . Since there is at most one compromised node in
the neighborhood of a normal agent, the selection of F = 1
should be sufficient to guarantee that none of the normal nodes
converge to attacker’s desired states, which is indeed the case
as indicated by the removal of all links between normal and
compromised nodes in Figure 6a. As we increase F , resilience
against attack is certainly achieved, but at the same time the
network becomes sparser as illustrated in Figures 6b and 6c.
In the case of non-stationary state estimation, the resulting
network topologies are similar, and hence, are not presented.
Figure 7 shows the estimation dynamics by R-DLMSAW
for the targets’ location wk,i(1) and wk,i(2) for every agent
k and iteration i from 0 to 5000 under attack. The attacked
nodes in the figure refer to the immediate neighbors of the
compromised nodes. Since there is at most one compromised
node in a normal node’s neighborhood, setting F ≥ 1 will
make R-DLMSAW algorithm resilient to attacks, which is
demonstrated by the results from the figure. We also observe
that by setting a smaller F value, which is sufficient to to
make the algorithm resilient, we achieve better estimation
performance (F = 1 has less noise than that of F = 5).
Figure 8 shows the steady-state MSD level of the net-
work for the three algorithms, that is, non-cooperative LMS,
DLMSAW, and R-DLMSAW. The simulation results validate
claims in Section VI. We observe that in the presence of
compromised nodes, DLMSAW performs the worst and has
the highest steady-state MSD. Since there is at most one
compromised node in the neighborhood of any normal node,
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the most appropriate value of F for R-DLMSAW is 1. We
note that the steady-state MSD is indeed minimum for F = 1.
As we increase F , the steady-state MSD also increases. In
fact, for F = 5, the performance of R-DLMSAW and non-
cooperative LMS is almost the same as we expect.
VIII. WEAK ATTACKS
Though it is common to assume a strong attacker with
complete knowledge when examining the resilience of a
distributed system, it is interesting to examine what an attacker
can do in practise if all the information is not available. In
this section, we analyze how the attack can still be deployed
on a normal agent k without the assumption of a strong
knowledge by the attacker (streaming data and parameters
used by k). We assume that an attacker has access only to
the intermediate estimates shared by agents with others in
their neighborhood. For instance, if l ∈ Nk then agent k
receives ψl,i from l and attacker also has an access to it.
We show that the other knowledge needed by the attacker can
actually be approximated in an alternative way, and the success
of the attack relies on how accurate this information can be
approximated. We refer to such an attack in which attacker
can only gather intermediate estimates and not the other data
(including streaming data and agent parameters) as the weak
attack.
The strong attack in (10) relies essentially on the knowledge
of wk,i−1, that is the estimated state of agent k in the
last iteration. If the attacker has complete knowledge, it can
compute wk,i−1 exactly as Lemma 1 indicates. However,
without such knowledge, wk,i−1 can only be approximately
computed. We note that approximatingwk,i−1 is equivalent to
approximating the weight matrix Ak(i) = [alk(i)], ∀l ∈ Nk.
This is true because wk,i =
∑
l∈Nk
alk(i)ψl,i, and ψl,i is
received by the attacker a from l.
Next, we discuss how to compute the approximated weight
matrix Aˆk(i − 1) using only the information ψl,i, ∀l ∈ Nk.
Note that the adaptation step (2) of diffusion can be written
as,
ψk,i = wk,i−1 +∇k,i = Ak(i − 1)Ψk,i−1 +∇k,i.
where ∇k,i = µku∗k,i(dk(i) − uk,iwk,i−1), Ψk,i−1 is an
|Nk| ×M matrix Ψk,i−1 = [ψl,i−1], ∀l ∈ Nk. Thus,
∇k,i = ψk,i −Ak(i − 1)Ψk,i−1,
and therefore,
lim
i→∞
E{‖∇k,i‖
2} = lim
i→∞
E{‖ψk,i −Ak(i− 1)Ψk,i−1‖
2}.
Since limi→∞ E{‖∇k,i‖2} = 0, the value of Ak(i) can be
approximated by assigning a cost function
ℓ(Ak(i)) , E{‖ψk,i+1 − Ak(i)Ψk,i‖
2},
where Ak(i) is the global minimizer of ℓ(Ak(i)) as i → ∞.
Next, we compute the successive estimators of the weight
matrix based on stochastic gradient descent method as follows:
Aˆk(i) = Aˆk(i− 1)− µ
′
A∇Aℓ(Aˆk(i− 1))
= Aˆk(i− 1) + µAΨk,i−1(ψk,i − Aˆk(i− 1)Ψk,i−1),
(20)
where µA =
1
2µ
′
A.
Also recall weight matrix Ak(i) has to satisfy the condition
(4). Thus, to make the adaptive approximation of weight ma-
trix hold condition (4), we introduce two more steps following
(20), that is the clip step and the normalization step. In the clip
step, the negative weights are clipped and are set to zero; and
the in the normalization step, weights are divided by their sum.
The operation for approximating weight matrix of a normal
agent k is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Approximate weight matrix for agent k
1 Input: l ∈ Nk, randomized alk(0) satisfying (4), µA, ψk,i,
Ψk,i−1
2 for i > 0 do
3 Ak(i) = Ak(i− 1) + µAΨk,i−1(ψk,i − Ak(i− 1)Ψk,i−1)
4 for l ∈ Nk do
5 alk(i) = max(alk(i), 0)
6 Ak(i) =
Ak(i)∑
alk(i)
7 return Ak(i)
We then approximate normal agent k’s estimated state by
wˆk,i = Aˆk(i)Ψk,i,
and use wˆk,i instead of wk,i. The attack model in (10) then
becomes
ψa,i = wˆk,i−1 + r
a
k(xi − wˆk,i−1). (21)
Note that the sufficient condition listed in Proposition 1
guarantees the convergence of the attack objective. However,
without an exact knowledge of wk,i−1 it is not guaranteed the
sufficient condition can be satisfied. In other words, the success
of the attack relies highly on how accurate the state wˆk,i can be
approximated. In the following, we provide evaluation results
for such an attack.
A. Evaluation
We adopt the same evaluation set-up as we used in section
VII. Initial network topology is the same as in 2a. Parameters
we select are: σ2u,k ∈ [0.75, 0.85], σ
2
k ∈ [0.75, 0.85] for each
agent k and µA = 0.002, while all the other settings are the
same as in section VII.
At the end of DLMSAW under weak attack, we reach the
network topology as shown in Figure 9a. From the plots,
we find some of the agents maintain connection with the
compromised nodes, while others do not, which is not the
case with a strong attack, where all the neighboring agents of a
compromised node end up cooperating only with the compro-
mised node. The main reason for this is that the weak attack
may not have an accurate approximation of normal agents’
state. Without an accurate approximation, compromised nodes
may not be able to collect large weights from their neighbors
and may not keep influencing the states of their neighbors.
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(a) F = 1 (b) F = 3 (c) F = 5
Fig. 6: Network topologies at the end of R-DLMSAW under strong attack (stationary targets) for various values of F .
(a) wk,i(1) (F = 1) (b) wk,i(2) (F = 1) (c) wk,i(1) (F = 5) (d) wk,i(2) (F = 5)
Fig. 7: Estimation dynamics for stationary target localization by R-DLMSAW under strong attack.
(a) Stationary targets (b) Non-stationary targets
Fig. 8: A comparison of MSD performance of non-cooperative LMS, DLMSAW, and R-DLMSAW under strong attack.
Figure 10 illustrates the estimation precision (‖wˆk,i−wk,i‖)
by the attacker. It shows that the attacker has different levels of
accuracy to estimate the states of its neighboring agents. For
some agents, the attacker has accurate approximation along
the simulation iterations. As a result, the attacker is more
likely to make its attack successful on those agents. However,
for other agents, the attacker does not have very good ap-
proximation accuracy and therefore, it is hard for the attacker
to successfully attack such agents. Figure 12 shows the state
estimation dynamics of normal agents (wherein attacked nodes
refer to the neighboring nodes of the compromised nodes). We
find the attacker can only drive a few of its neighbors to its
desired state, whereas most of the normal neighbors converge
to their true goal state, which is consistent with the results of
Figure 10. The steady-state MSD performance for the weak
attack is shown in the yellow line in Figure 11. We find that
such an attack still worsens the network steady-state MSD
as compared to the non-cooperative LMS (the blue line) and
DLMSAW without attack (the red line).
Next, we evaluate the proposed resilient diffusion algorithm
R-DLMSAW against the weak attack. The network topology
at the end of simulation is shown in Figure 9b. Most normal
agents have cut the link with the compromised nodes. Yet
some links are maintained because these compromised nodes
behave in a benign way as to send message with a smaller cost
than a normal neighbor of the targeted node. In other words,
these compromised nodes exchange a state message similar to
normal nodes in order to maintain communication with them.
Therefore, such links need not to be cut down to achieve the
network resilience. Figure 13 shows the estimation dynamics
of normal nodes by R-DLMSAW. We find none of the attacked
nodes are driven to the attacker’s selected state. All the nodes
successfully converge to their true goal states. The purple line
in Figure 11 shows the steady-state MSD performance of R-
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DLMSAW with F = 1. We observe that this line lies between
the noncooperative LMS and DLMSAW (without attack), and
has a much smaller steady-state MSD than DLMSAW under
such attack. This illustrates the effectiveness of the proposed
resilient diffusion algorithm by showing that the algorithm is
resilient to not only strong but also to weak attacks, as well
as other data falsification attacks.
IX. RELATED WORK
Many distributed algorithms are vulnerable to cyber attacks.
The existence of an adversarial agent may prevent the algo-
rithm from performing the desired task. Distributed consensus
and diffusion based strategies are often employed to resolve
distributed estimation and optimization problems, for instance
see [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [2]. Resilience of consensus-
based distributed algorithms in the presence of malicious
nodes has received considerable attention in recent years. In
particular, the approaches presented in [24], [25], [11], [26]
consider the consensus problem for scalar parameters in the
presence of attackers, and resilience is achieved by leveraging
high connectivity. Resilient consensus in the case of special
network structures, such as triangular networks for distributed
robotic applications [27], has also been studied. To achieve
resilience in sparse networks, [28] presents the idea of employ-
ing few trusted nodes, which are hardened nodes that cannot be
attacked. Resilience for concensus+innovation problems have
also been studied by [29], [30], [31] in a fully-distributed way
via agents’ local observations and high network connectivity.
Resilience can also be achieved via fault detection and iso-
lation (FDI). For instance, [32] studied the FDI problem for
linear consensus networks via high connectivity networks and
global knowledge of the network structure by each agent. [33]
considered a similar FDI problem for second-order systems.
Authors in [34] presented distributed detection method for
consensus+innovation algorithms via local observations of
agents only. For attacks, typical approaches usually consider
Byzantine adversaries with fixed target different than the true
value [11] or with updates without time-dependent intention
[34], [30] and assume that the goal of the attacker is to
disrupt the convergence (stability) of the distributed algorithm.
In contrast, this work focuses on attacks that do not disrupt
convergence but drive normal agents to converge to states
selected by the attacker. Moreover, in our attack model, the
attacker continuously changes its values over time as compared
to the fixed value attacks considered previously.
Resilience of diffusion-based distributed algorithms has
been studied in [2], [5], [8]. Similar to the resilient consensus
problems, fixed-value attacks are usually considered, and the
main approach has been to use adaptive combination rules
to counteract malicious values. This is an effective measure
and has been applied to multi-task networks and distributed
clustering problems [5]. Several variants focusing on adaptive
weights applied to multi-task networks can be found in [35],
[36], [18], [37]. Note that the essence of adaptive weights
is similar to distributed detection. In contrast, it turns the
detection method from a binary classification problem to a
regression problem. Detection approach has also been applied
in [35] for clustering over diffusion networks. Although adap-
tive weights provide some degree of resilience to byzantine
adversaries with fixed values, we have shown in this work
that adaptive weights may introduce vulnerabilities that allow
time-dependent deception attacks.
Finally, there has been considerable work on applications of
diffusion algorithms that include spectrum sensing in cognitive
networks [3], target localization [4], distributed clustering [5],
biologically inspired designs [6]. Although our approach can
be used for resilience of various applications, we have focused
on multi-target localization [18].
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied distributed diffusion for multi-
task networks and investigated vulnerabilities introduced by
adaptive weights. Cooperative diffusion is a powerful strat-
egy to perform optimization and estimation tasks, however,
its performance and accuracy can deteriorate significantly
in the presence of adversarial nodes. In fact, cooperative
diffusion performs significantly better (in terms of steady-
state MSD) as compared to non-cooperative diffusion if there
are no adversarial nodes. However, with adversaries, cooper-
ative diffusion could be even worse than the non-cooperative
diffusion. To illustrate this, we proposed attack models that
can drive normal agents—implementing distributed diffusion
(DLMSAW)—to any state selected by the attacker, for both
stationary and non-stationary estimation. We then proposed
a resilient distributed diffusion algorithm (R-DLMSAW) to
counteract adversaries’ effect. The proposed algorithm always
performs at least as good as the non-cooperative diffusion,
but if an input parameter F in the algorithm is selected
appropriately, it performs significantly better than the non-
cooperative diffusion in the presence of adversaries. We also
analyzed how the performance of R-DLMSAW changes with
the selection of parameter F by the nodes. We evaluated our
approach by applying it to stationary and non-stationary multi-
target localization. In future, we are interested in generalizing
our model to other types of distributed diffusion algorithms
and with the missing data. It is also worth investigating the
relationship between the underlying network connectivity and
the steady-state performance of such algorithms.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The message received by a from k ∈ Na is ψk,i. Agent a
can compute wk,i−1 from ψk,i using
wk,i−1 = ψk,i − µku
∗
k,i(dk(i)− uk,iwk,i−1),
from which it can compute wk,i−1 as:
wk,i−1 =
ψk,i − µku∗k,idk(i)
1− µku∗k,iuk,i
.
Given the knowledge of µk, dk(i), and uk,i, the value wk,i−1
can be computed exactly.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We use δa,k,i to denote ‖ψa,i −wk,i−1‖, and δl,k,i to denote
‖ψl,i −wk,i−1‖, for l ∈ Nk, l 6= a. Since
γ2lk(i) = (1 − νk)γ
2
lk(i− 1) + νk‖ψl,i −wk,i−1‖
2, l ∈ Nk,
Suppose the attack starts at ia, then at iteration (ia + n),
γ2ak(ia + n)
=(1 − νk)γ
2
ak(ia + n− 1) + νkδ
2
a,k,ia+n
=(1 − νk)((1 − νk)γ
2
ak(ia + n− 2) + νkδ
2
a,k,ia+n−1)
+ νkδ
2
a,k,ia+n
=(1 − νk)
n+1γ2ak(ia − 1)
+ νk[(1− νk)
nδ2a,k,ia + (1− νk)
n−1δ2a,k,ia+1
+ . . .+ (1− νk)δ
2
a,k,ia+n−1 + δ
2
a,k,ia+n],
γ2lk(ia + n) =(1 − νk)
n+1γ2lk(ia − 1)
+ νk[(1− νk)
nδ2l,k,ia + (1− νk)
n−1δ2l,k,ia+1
+ . . .+ (1 − νk)δ
2
l,k,ia+n−1 + δ
2
l,k,ia+n].
For large enough n, (1 − νk)n+1 → 0. Since we assume
‖ψa,i −wk,i−1‖ ≪ ‖ψl,i −wk,i−1‖, i.e., δa,k,i ≪ δl,k,i, for
i ≥ ia + n, γ2ak(i)≪ γ
2
lk(i) holds. Thus,
alk(i)
aak(i)
∝
γ−2lk (i)
γ−2ak (i)
→ 0. (22)
Given the property of weights, (13) is true.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
We use A to denote the set of compromised nodes targeting at
the same normal node k. The proposed attack strategy results
in the following condition holding as proved in Lemma 2:
alk(i)
aak(i)
→ 0, l ∈ Nk\A, a ∈ A,
(i ≥ ia + n, subject to (1− νk)
n+1 = 0).
Given that
∑
l∈Nk
alk = 1, we have
alk(i) = 0, aak(i) =
1
|A|
, l ∈ Nk\A, a ∈ A,
where |A| denotes the number of nodes in A. Since every
compromised node a ∈ A sends the same message and is
assigned the same weight that sums up to 1, it is equivalent
to only one compromised node attacking the target node and
being assigned a weight of 1. Therefore, there is no need for
multiple compromised nodes attacking a single normal node.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The constraint of rak is consistent with the condition of Lemma
2. Thus, from some point i, the state of node k will be attacked
as to be:
wk,i = wk,i−1 − r
a
k(wk,i−1 − xi)
= rakxi + (1− r
a
k)wk,i−1,
(i ≥ ia + n, subject to (1− νk)
n+1 = 0).
(23)
Let Xi be wk,i, Xi−1 be wk,i−1, Ai be r
a
kxi, and B be
(1− rak). Equation (23) turns to:
Xi = Ai +BXi−1. (24)
Assume limi→∞Xi−1 = X
0
i−1 and limi→∞Xi = X
0
i , then
for i→∞ we get:
X0i = Ai +BX
0
i−1. (25)
Subtract (25) from (24), we get Xi−X0i = B(Xi−1−X
0
i−1).
Let εi = Xi − X0i , for i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., then εi = Bεi−1 =
B2εi−2 = . . . = B
iε0. The necessary and sufficient require-
ment for convergence is limi→∞ εi = 0 or, limi→∞B
iε0 = 0,
that is,
lim
i→∞
Bi = 0. (26)
Therefore, we get a necessary and sufficient requirement for
convergence as |B| < 1. Since B = 1 − rak , and r
a
k ∈ (0, 1),
we get B ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, limi→∞(Xi − X0i ) = 0. The
assumption limi→∞Xi = X
0
i holds, and therefore, Xi is
convergent to X0i .
To get the value of X0i , we need to analyze the following
two scenarios: stationary state estimation and non-stationary
state estimation, separately.
1) Stationary state estimation: In stationary scenarios, the
convergence state is independent of time, that is, X0i =
X0i−1 = X
0. Therefore, equation (25) turns to:
X0 = Ai +BX
0.
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Thus, (1−B)X0 = Ai, X0 =
Ai
1−B . The convergent point is:
wk,i =
rakxi+1
1− (1− rak)
=
rakw
a
k
1− (1− rak)
= wak = w
a
k,i, i→∞
which realizes the attacker’s objective (7).
2) Non-stationary state estimation: In non-stationary sce-
narios, we first assume xi = w
a
k + θ
a
k,i−1 and later we will
show how θak,i−1 turns to θ
a
k,i−1 +
∆θak,i−1
ra
k
.
Assume the convergence point X0i is a combination of a
time-independent value and a time-dependent value, such that
X0i = X
0 + ρi. After taking original values into (25), we get
X0 + ρi = r
a
k(w
a
k + θ
a
k,i−1) + (1− r
a
k)(X0 + ρi−1). (27)
Next, we divide (27) into the time-independent and time-
dependent components to get
X0 = wak , ρi − ρi−1 = r
a
k(θ
a
k,i−1 − ρi−1).
Let ∆ρi−1 = ρi − ρi−1, we get:
ρi−1 = θ
a
k,i−1 −
∆ρi−1
rak
and ρi = θ
a
k,i −
∆ρi
rak
. (28)
Thus, ∆ρi−1 = ρi−ρi−1 = θak,i−θ
a
k,i−1−
1
ra
k
(∆ρi−∆ρi−1).
Let ∆θak,i−1 = θ
a
k,i−θ
a
k,i−1 and ∆
2ρi−1 = ∆ρi−∆ρi−1, then
∆ρi−1 = ∆θ
a
k,i−1 −
∆2ρi−1
ra
k
or ∆ρi = ∆θ
a
k,i −
∆2ρi
ra
k
.
If we assume ∆
2ρi
ra
k
≪ ∆θak,i, then we have ∆ρi = ∆θ
a
k,i.
Therefore, (28) can be written as ρi = θ
a
k,i−
∆θak,i
ra
k
. Thus, the
dynamic convergence point for k is
wk,i = w
a
k + θ
a
k,i −
∆θak,i
rak
, i→∞.
This means when sending ψa,i = wk,i−1 + r
a
k(w
a
k + θ
a
k,i−1 −
wk,i−1) as the communication message, the compromised
node a can make k converge to wak + θ
a
k,i −
∆θak,i
ra
k
. To make
agent k converge to a desired state wak +Ω
a
k,i, we assume the
message sent is
ψa,i = wk,i−1 + r
a
k(w
a
k +mi−1 −wk,i−1).
The corresponding convergence point will be wak+mi−
∆mi
ra
k
.
We want the following equation to hold,
wak +mi −
∆mi
rak
= wak +Ω
a
k,i. (29)
Assuming ∆2mi → 0, the solution of (29) is: mi = Ωak,i +
∆Ωak,i
ra
k
, meaning to make k converge to a desired state wak +
Ωak,i, the compromised node a should send communication
message:
ψa,i = wk,i−1 + r
a
k(w
a
k +Ω
a
k,i−1 +
∆Ωak,i−1
rak
−wk,i−1).
Thus, to make k converge to wak + θ
a
k,i, the compromised
node a should send communication message:
ψa,i = wk,i−1 + r
a
k(w
a
k + θ
a
k,i−1 +
∆θak,i−1
rak
−wk,i−1).
The convergence point is:
wk,i = w
a
k + θ
a
k,i = w
a
k,i, i→∞,
which realizes the attacker’s objective (7).
We can verify the convergence point by putting xi = w
a
k +
θak,i−1+
∆θak,i−1
ra
k
,wk,i = w
a
k+θ
a
k,i,wk,i−1 = w
a
k+θ
a
k,i−1 back
into equation (23), we get:
wak + θ
a
k,i = r
a
k(w
a
k + θ
a
k,i−1 +
∆θak,i−1
rak
) + (1− rak)(w
a
k + θ
a
k,i−1)
θak,i = r
a
k(θ
a
k,i−1 +
∆θak,i−1
rak
) + (1 − rak)θ
a
k,i−1
θak,i = θ
a
k,i−1 +∆θ
a
k,i−1.
The resulting equation holds, illustrating the validity of the
convergence state.
